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PROLOGUE 
In 1933, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., gave a speech to the New York State 
Bankers Association.1 Berle captured well some of the main problems we 
face in regulating banks, and financial systems more generally. Several 
of his points sound themes that are crucial to this Article. One is the huge 
difficulties created by the inevitable need to predict a highly uncertain 
future: 
The part of a prophet is always a difficult and dangerous one, but 
the difference between banking, law, politics and pure academics is 
that in all but the latter you have to be a prophet. Not only do you 
have to prophesy, but you have to bet on the result. When you make 
a loan, when you take a deposit, when you go through any one of 
the normal banking operations, you have estimated what the future 
both of that particular operation and of the general condition which 
surrounded it will probably be.2 
Berle also pointed to the vulnerability of banks to contagious  
panics: 
In the last analysis, when there is mass movement in progress, the 
system becomes one in the public mind whether you choose it or 
not. It ceases to be a question of the safety of this bank as against 
that bank. It becomes a question of the safety of any bank at all. 
And as that mass movement finally developed, it became perfectly 
obvious that collective action was required.3 
                                                 
† Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Paul Rubin and participants at the 
Berle II Symposium for helpful comments. 
 1. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Address at the Fortieth Annual Convention of the New York State Bank-
ers Association: The Future of American Banking (June 26, 1933). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. at 7. 
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This is a major problem because banks are central to the whole 
economy: 
You are also familiar with the very simple economic fact that the 
level of prices, the level of economic activity, which in turn means 
employment, and much of what we call prosperity, has a very close 
relation to the aggregate volume of currency and credit. . . . The 
banks, therefore, form a private group which without any correla-
tion among its members, really dominates a large part of the eco-
nomic life of the country.4 
This all creates a massive collective action problem: 
Think broadly and not personally, because the individual interest 
today must be subordinated to the overwhelming national interest. 
Our first concern must be that the country shall not commit suicide.5 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In case we needed reminding (and many of us did), the recent fi-
nancial crisis has demonstrated that capitalist financial systems are prone 
to cycles of heady booms and dismaying busts, and those busts can cast 
the entire economy into recession or worse.6 The last and greatest re-
minder of this within the United States was the Great Depression. In the 
1930s, contentious debate broke out as to what the government can and 
should do to moderate the boom–bust cycle. Could monetary policy de-
termined by a central bank improve stability, or was it the main culprit 
behind the Depression? Could fiscal policy in the form of large govern-
ment deficits help end contractions early? Do we need regulation to con-
trol financial markets, and if so, how extensive should it be and what 
form should it take? In the 1930s, FDR and the New Deal made great 
changes in American monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy. In the latest 
crisis, those questions have become contentious again with new reforms 
debated and deployed, although the reforms have been far more incre-
mental than those of the New Deal. 
Great scholars, public intellectuals, and policymakers debated the 
pros and cons of governmental intervention in the wake of the Great De-
pression. The ideas developed then have helped shape debate ever since, 
although they have been transformed in the course of that ongoing de-
bate. At the heart of that debate are two theoretical approaches to the 
                                                 
 4. Id. at 9. 
 5. Id. at 15. 
 6. See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, PANICS, MANIAS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); CARMEN REINHART & KENNETH 
ROGOFF, THIS TIME IT’S DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
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economics of business cycles: Austrian7 and Keynesian8 business cycle 
theory. The two are deeply opposed in their basic policy commitments, 
with the Austrians advocating a strongly anti-interventionist approach 
while Keynesians support active governmental intervention. And yet, the 
underlying economic theories of these two antagonists have much in 
common. Both focus on the role of financial institutions and markets in 
driving business cycles, and both have understandings of the role of ex-
pectations and uncertainty that are much more realistic than the rational 
expectations approach which has dominated mainstream macroeconom-
ics for the last few decades.9 
I find the emphasis on expectations in the face of deep uncertainty a 
highly useful element of both theoretical approaches. That emphasis con-
trasts nicely with a focus on incentives and greed that characterizes much 
modern thinking about economics and politics. Both ignorance and greed 
matter in understanding how the economy works, but too often we tend 
to slight the importance of ignorance and uncertainty. That tendency 
leads to a certain arrogance and moralism in much thought on how best 
to regulate the economy. A needed humility should come from putting 
front and center the fact that none of us, neither governmental regulators, 
private market actors, nor scholarly commentators, really understands in 
any remotely adequate way what is going on in our economy. How can 
and should we regulate our economic affairs in light of that ignorance? 
In a companion piece, I ponder that question.10 I use the libertarian-
ism of Friedrich Hayek,11 the conservatism of Michael Oakeshott,12 and 
                                                 
 7. The originator of this approach was Ludwig von Mises. See generally LUDWIG VON MISES, 
THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT (1912); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION (1949). The 
most important and influential developer of Austrian business cycle theory was Friedrich von Hayek. 
See generally FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (1931); FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, 
PROFITS, INTEREST, AND INVESTMENT (1939); FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF 
CAPITAL (1941); FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, MONEY, CAPITAL, AND FLUCTUATIONS (1984) (essays 
from 1925–1936). 
 8. The originator of this approach was, of course, John Maynard Keynes. See generally JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936). But 
the variant on which I focus was best developed by Hyman Minsky. See generally HYMAN MINSKY, 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975); HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986). 
 9. The original rational expectations article was John F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the 
Theory of Price Movements, 29 ECONOMETRICA 315 (1961). For overviews, see generally STEVEN 
M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed. 1996); Thomas J. Sargent, Rational Expectations, 
in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2007). 
 10. Brett H. McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a 
Financial Crisis, PENN. STATE L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1753760. 
 11. See generally HAYEK, sources cited supra note 7; see also FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE 
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). 
 12. See generally MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(1962). 
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the liberalism13 of John Maynard Keynes14 as guides to formulating a 
general approach to financial regulation in the face of deep uncertainty. I 
choose those three thinkers both because of their contrasting normative 
positions and also because each was among the leading thinkers to really 
put uncertainty at the heart of their thinking about politics and the econ-
omy. I suggest an approach I call “cowardly interventions”15 as a triangu-
lation of the three positions. Following Keynes, I recognize that uncer-
tainty leads to deep instability in financial economics, so that some go-
vernmental intervention is needed to create greater stability. But follow-
ing Hayek and Oakeshott, I recognize the limits of governmental inter-
vention, and stress that such intervention should as much as possible 
draw on past experience, work with rather than against markets, and be 
moderate and subject to regular evaluation and reconsideration. I apply 
this framework to the Dodd-Frank Act,16 the revision of financial regula-
tion following the recent financial crisis, and argue that on balance the 
Act is an exemplary exercise in cowardly interventions. 
Here, I approach the problem from a slightly different but very 
closely related perspective. I focus more on the economics of financial 
markets and regulation rather than the broader philosophical inquiry of 
the other article, and I narrow the competing positions to libertarianism 
and liberalism.17 I take more of an historical approach, following the de-
velopment of Austrian and Keynesian theories of the business cycle from 
their origins in the 1930s to today. I consider the details of recent finan-
cial regulation less than in the companion article, but I consider financial 
regulation in tandem with monetary and fiscal policy more than in that 
article. Considering financial regulation along with monetary and fiscal 
policy is a worthwhile move. Each of these three types of interventions 
can help both to dampen inflationary booms and also to shorten and ease 
recessionary busts. Thus, to some extent, the three types of policies are 
substitutes. The optimal level for each depends in part upon what is hap-
pening with the other two. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II categorizes approaches to 
governmental interventions to stabilize the markets into four types. The 
                                                 
 13. I use “liberal” in the modern American sense. Liberals in the classical nineteenth-century 
sense I call “libertarians.” 
 14. See generally KEYNES, supra note 8; JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 
(1932). 
 15. The term is deliberately deflating to emphasize the inherent imperfection of any approach 
given our limited understanding. 
 16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010). 
 17. I do not think that Burkean (or Oakeshottean) conservatism offers a distinct program within 
economics. 
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categorization is based on two distinctions. One distinction is between 
libertarians, who greatly distrust government and advocate at most very 
limited interventions, and liberals, who distrust the volatility of financial 
markets and advocate more extensive interventions. The other distinction 
focuses on the source of distrust of markets or governments. Distrust 
may emphasize problems of greed or of ignorance. As noted above, a 
distinctive and welcome characteristic of the Austrian and Keynesian 
theories is that they focus more on ignorance than on greed. 
Part III begins the analysis of Austrian and Keynesian theories of 
the business cycle, describing some important similarities as well as dif-
ferences. Each focuses on the importance of investor expectations in 
making investment decisions in the face of deep uncertainty. Both see 
investors regularly becoming involved in speculative booms in which 
optimistic expectations of future profits lead to overly high levels of cap-
ital investment. But the theories differ in their analysis of the source of 
these expectations. Austrians blame central bank monetary policy, while 
Keynesians see them as the result of high animal spirits following a pe-
riod of relative calm and prosperity. Both theories agree that after a while 
such booms become unsustainable. Eventually expectations shift, and a 
contraction begins. The contraction can be long and painful, especially as 
banks, businesses, and households must unwind the large amounts of 
debt incurred during the boom. The two theories characteristically differ, 
though, as to the wisdom of governmental intervention to try to lessen 
the severity and length of the contraction. 
Part IV considers developments in the Austrian approach. Con-
tained within the heart of the theory is a recognition of the potential in-
stability of financial markets, which creates serious tension with the 
strongly libertarian commitments of the approach. I identify four strains 
of responses within the approach: Panglossian, antifractional reserve 
banking, pessimistic, and cowardly interventionist. The first downplays 
the seriousness of market instability, not very plausibly. The second re-
cognizes the seriousness of market instability, but prescribes a ban on 
fractional reserve banking—a highly implausible policy. The third also 
recognizes the seriousness of market instability, but is so pessimistic 
about the likely effects of governmental intervention that it recommends 
living even with very severe periodic depressions rather than trying to 
stabilize markets. The fourth is more pragmatic, and allows that a mod-
erate amount of intervention in the form of monetary, fiscal, and finan-
cial regulatory policy is appropriate. This fourth response fits within 
what I call cowardly interventionism, though it tends to the more co-
wardly side of the spectrum. 
1284 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1279 
Part V considers developments in the Keynesian and related liberal 
approaches. That theory highlights deeper problems within financial 
markets than the Austrian theory typically recognizes and, hence, favors 
greater governmental intervention. Yet further reflection upon both the 
cognitive limits of governmental actors and also the political pressures 
they are likely to face, in light of historical experience during the postwar 
years, suggests deep problems for governmental interventions. In re-
sponse, some liberals rather naively call for politicians and bureaucrats to 
do a better, more intelligent and honest, job. Others call for quite exten-
sive financial rules to try to limit the influence of the financial sector. But 
another response takes the limits on governmental action very seriously, 
and, as a result, advocates more limited intervention than other liberals 
would like. This response fits within what I call cowardly intervention-
ism, though it tends to the more interventionist side of the spectrum. 
Part VI provides more description of what cowardly interventions 
within monetary policy, fiscal policy, and financial regulation look like. 
This includes discussion of tensions that still exist within each policy 
area between those who approach cowardly interventions from the liber-
tarian end and those who approach from the liberal end. On balance, the 
actions taken during the crisis and the regulation imposed after the worst 
of the crisis look like sensible cowardly interventions, although certainly 
plenty of mistakes were made. Part VII concludes. 
II. FOUR APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS 
Our topic is the appropriate mix of markets and government inter-
vention in markets in trying to reduce financial instability. We can identi-
fy two central tendencies among advocates: libertarian and liberal. Liber-
tarians tend to advocate fewer and weaker interventions with markets, 
while liberals tend to advocate more and stronger interventions. The ten-
dencies can be explained and justified by differing degrees of trust and 
distrust for the two types of institutions—financial markets and govern-
ment. Libertarians distrust government more, while liberals distrust fi-
nancial markets more. 
Of course, that states it rather baldly. A given person may well dis-
trust both financial markets and government. Indeed, a key thesis of this 
Article is that quite strong distrust of both is the healthiest position. 
Thinkers will vary both in their absolute levels of distrust and in the 
comparative strength of their distrust of the two institutions. But what 
characterizes libertarians is their relatively greater distrust of government 
than markets, with the extremism of their libertarianism tending to in-
crease with an increase in relative distrust of the government. Similarly, 
what characterizes liberals (as I use the term here) is their relatively 
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greater distrust of financial markets than of government, with the extrem-
ism of their liberalism tending to increase with an increase in relative 
distrust of the markets. 
Theorists can also be distinguished along a different axis. This dis-
tinction focuses upon their reasons for distrusting a particular institution, 
be it markets or government. Put simply, distrust can flow from a belief 
in either the greed of participants in one of the institutions, or a belief in 
their ignorance. Of course, both greed and ignorance are ever-present 
elements of all human institutions. But theorists differ in their accounts 
both of the strength and importance of these factors, and also in their ac-
counts of how frequently these human weaknesses lead to bad outcomes. 
Thus, pro-market libertarians certainly accept that greed is widespread 
among market actors, but they believe that markets tend to work so that 
social good results from behavior motivated by private greed.18 
Once again, individual theorists may account for both greed and ig-
norance, and another key thesis of this Article is that both provide impor-
tant reasons for distrust, although I will particularly emphasize ignor-
ance, in part because I think its importance is generally under-
acknowledged. But here too, different theorists tend to concentrate more 
upon one or the other, with the degree of relative emphasis differing for 
different thinkers. 
Combining these two categorizations of theories leads to four ap-
proaches to governmental intervention, as seen in Table 1. Of the two 
varieties of libertarian approaches, one focuses on greed or incentive 
problems to explain its distrust of governmental intervention. I refer to 
this as the public choice approach. A host of scholars have developed 
this general approach, including Stigler,19 Buchanan, Tullock,20 Olson,21 
and Niskanen.22 Public choice theory emphasizes various pathologies 
likely to afflict governmental policymaking. Industry capture and bu-
reaucratic aggrandizement are the leading concerns. Financial regulation 
is ripe for industry capture. Consumers and members of the general pub-
lic each individually have a small stake in this regulation and lack the 
expertise to evaluate a very complex regulatory regime. Financial indus-
try companies and insiders, by contrast, have much at stake and plenty of 
                                                 
 18. An argument, of course, associated with the “invisible hand” metaphor of Adam Smith. See 
generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 160 (1776). 
 19. See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 20. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1958). 
 21. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 22. See generally WILLIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1971). 
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expertise. The latter are much more likely to engage in effective lobbying 
to advance their interests.23 Bureaucratic aggrandizement occurs as regu-
lators are guided by their own self-interest. Agencies with extensive rules 
and large budgets are likely to be more prestigious and offer higher sala-
ries. Bureaucrats may thus be motivated to enact multiple complex rules 
as a way of maximizing their own power.24 Fiscal policy is even more 
ripe for interest group manipulation, as fiscal policy is the net result of all 
governmental spending and taxing, and thus subject to all interest group 
lobbying over the budget. Monetary policy is probably somewhat easier 
to partially shield from interest group lobbying, though here too we shall 
see there are concerns. 
 
  Why Institution Is Distrusted 
 
  Greed 
 
Ignorance 
Institution 
Most 
Distrusted 
 
Government 
Public Choice 
–Buchanan 
–Stigler 
Austrian 
–Mises 
–Hayek 
 
Market 
Progressive 
–Brandeis 
–Stiglitz 
Keynesian 
–Keynes 
–Minsky 
 
The Austrian approach to financial markets is also libertarian in 
tendency, but it characteristically focuses on problems of ignorance ra-
ther than greed in justifying its distrust of government intervention. The 
Austrian tradition began with von Mises and Hayek, and more recent 
advocates include Murray Rothbard25 and, to a certain extent, Tyler Co-
wen.26 This tradition emphasizes the serious uncertainty that entrepre-
neurs and banks face in making decisions about future investment. This 
uncertainty helps create a tendency towards instability within the finan-
cial system. Central banks exacerbate this tendency. Loose monetary pol-
icy sends false signals into the price system. Although perfectly adminis-
tered monetary policy could potentially help stabilize markets, central 
bankers lack the omniscience required to administer such a policy. 
                                                 
 23. This sort of situation is ripe for exploitation by the interested group. See generally OLSON, 
supra note 21. 
 24. See generally NISKANEN, supra note 22. 
 25. See generally MURRAY ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION (1963); MURRAY 
ROTHBARD, WHAT HAS GOVERNMENT DONE TO OUR MONEY? (1963). 
 26. See generally TYLER COWEN, RISK AND BUSINESS CYCLES: NEW AND OLD AUSTRIAN 
PERSPECTIVES (1997). 
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Liberals likewise can be split into two categories based on different 
reasons for distrusting financial markets. One group focuses on greed; I 
will call these the Progressives. A key early Progressive was Louis Bran-
deis;27 Joseph Stiglitz is a contemporary exemplar.28 These scholars em-
phasize various informational imperfections and externalities that afflict 
Smith’s invisible hand with a violent tremor. At their worst, financial 
markets can feature rampant fraud and abuse. Even well short of that, 
speculation and high indebtedness can make financial markets vulnerable 
to causing great harm to a large number of people. 
Finally, what I will call the Keynesian school present a rather dif-
ferent set of arguments for the liberal, relatively interventionist position. 
Keynes himself is, of course, the key figure, with a variety of post-
Keynesian economists, above all Hyman Minsky, as important followers 
and developers of the ideas.29 The Keynesians emphasize ignorance ra-
ther than greed as the Achilles’ heel of financial markets. Business 
people must make decisions now based on predicted consequences years 
in the future. Markets can be subject to alternating waves of optimism 
and pessimism. This ignorance and uncertainty can lead to great insta-
bility, creating a possibility for financial regulation, along with monetary 
and fiscal policy, to help stabilize the economy. 
In this Article, I will focus especially on the two approaches that 
emphasize ignorance, the Austrians and Keynesians. In part, that is be-
cause I think that economists and lawyers tend to dwell too much on in-
centive issues and ignore the crucial importance of ignorance and uncer-
tainty. Not only does this lead to analysts ignoring important problems, 
but it also creates a pernicious attitude on the part of scholars studying 
these matters. A focus on incentives and greed leads to a smug, moraliz-
ing view of either market actors or bureaucrats and politicians or both. 
The disengaged, morally pure scholar is then well-placed to confidently 
pronounce on the best approach to financial stabilization. In contrast, 
those who focus on uncertainty and ignorance should be more prone to 
humility. And humility is the proper attitude to bring towards the highly 
complex and difficult task of analyzing financial stabilization. 
In future sections we shall consider how the Austrians, with admix-
tures of public choice, and the Keynesians, with admixtures of Progres-
sivism, responded to the Great Depression, how their theories developed 
                                                 
 27. See generally LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
(1914). 
 28. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING 
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010). 
 29. See generally supra note 8. Another notable post-Keynesian is Paul Davidson. See general-
ly PAUL DAVIDSON, THE KEYNES SOLUTION: THE PATH TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY (2009). 
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over time, and how their descendants have addressed our latest financial 
crisis. We shall see the various schools mutating in interesting ways. At 
least the more sane members of differing schools often come to realize 
that there are good reasons to distrust their own preferred institution, be 
it the government or markets. The differing approaches thus evolve in 
ways that bring them closer together as observers realize that greed and 
ignorance plague both government and markets.30 
III. COMMONALITIES OF THE AUSTRIAN AND KEYNESIAN 
UNDERSTANDING OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 
Though frequently seen as opposite ends of the political spectrum, 
the Austrian and Keynesian business cycle theories share important ele-
ments. Much more than the dominant macroeconomic models of recent 
decades,31 these theories emphasize the role of financial institutions and 
markets. They also both feature a major role for the expectations of en-
trepreneurs and investors, and their understandings of those expectations 
is less rationalistic than the dominant models in contemporary econom-
ics. In short, markets and economies are wilder and less tamed in Aus-
trian and Keynesian theories than in the mathematical models that mod-
ern economists love. 
Both theories see a boom–bust cycle driven by expectations and the 
credit market. A critical element of modern capitalist economies is that 
entrepreneurs and investors must make decisions about large-scale capi-
tal investments, which will take years to come to fruition. These deci-
sions are necessarily based upon current expectations of future condi-
tions. But those current expectations are fragile and changeable, and 
sometimes the expectations will turn out to have been too optimistic. As 
investors then retrench, problems emerge. 
Start with the boom period of a credit cycle. Expectations of future 
profits from current long-term capital projects go up for some reason. 
The characteristic reasons in the two theories differ significantly. For 
Austrian theory, the characteristic reason is lowered interest rates driven 
by expansive monetary policy.32 For Keynesian theory as developed by 
                                                 
 30. My intellectual history here is brazenly Whiggish. I have my own perspective, which mixes 
elements of all four approaches and features severe distrust of both government and markets based 
on both ignorance and greed (with an emphasis on ignorance). I am, hence, attracted to elements in 
the history of all approaches that converge to my own preferred perspective. 
 31. For rational expectations, see generally supra note 9; for real business cycle theory, see 
generally Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Understanding Business Cycles, 5 CARNEGIE–ROCHESTER CONF. 
SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 7 (1977); Charles I. Plosser, Understanding Real Business Cycles, 3 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 51 (1989); dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory, Camilo Tovar, DSGE Models and 
Central Banks (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 258, 2008). 
 32. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION, supra note 25, at 9. 
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Minsky, the characteristic reason is high confidence and greater appetite 
for risk brought on by a period of calm and prosperity.33 In either case, 
the expectation of future profits leads to increased investment in capital-
intensive industries. It also leads to increased debt to support much of 
that investment. As long as the optimistic expectations of future profits 
are met, the investments will be profitable and the debt can be paid off. 
But eventually the boom becomes unsustainable. Profits are not as 
high as expected, and some of the investments from the good times be-
come unprofitable. Some of the debt becomes increasingly hard to repay. 
Investors must retrench and find ways to save money to repay their 
debts. They cut back on new investments and labor costs. Some of the 
industries that had grown quickly during the boom now shrink. The con-
tractionary phase can be long and painful, as investors turn cautious until 
their financial standing solidifies, and resources move out of unprofitable 
areas.34 
The Austrian and Keynesian theories differ, though, in their under-
standing of the role of government in the booms and the busts. As for the 
booms, Austrians blame the government, and, in particular, central 
banks’ conduct of monetary policy, for leading to overinvestment in 
areas that will turn out to be unprofitable.35 The Keynesians, by contrast, 
blame financial market participants for becoming too optimistic and see 
properly conducted monetary policy as a way of holding down the 
booms.36 As we shall see, though, each theory can concede a good deal 
of ground to the other in their understanding of the boom phase. Austrian 
theory, in its best versions, understands that even without mistaken mon-
etary policy, markets on their own can be unstable and generate booms 
that eventually lead to busts.37 Keynesian theory, again in its best ver-
sions, in turn understands that bad monetary policy can be procyclical 
rather than countercyclical and, hence, can make matters worse.38 But 
still, the emphases differ. 
As for the busts, the two approaches differ more strongly. The Aus-
trians typically believe that government can do almost nothing useful to 
stop a slide once it starts. Bad investments have occurred, these must be 
unwound, and that necessarily involves a good deal of pain for a long 
time. Attempts to ease the pain will merely prolong it and delay the shifts 
                                                 
 33. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 233–38. 
 34. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION, supra note 25, at 13–14; MINSKY, 
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 245. 
 35. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION, supra note 25, at 9. 
 36. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 324–26. 
 37. See infra notes 67–86 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
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in resources that need to occur.39 By contrast, Keynesians think that in 
the bust, investors in all sectors will pull back as expectations turn bleak, 
leading to a general unwillingness to invest or spend and a resulting lack 
of aggregate demand. At this point, stimulative monetary and fiscal poli-
cy can reduce the intensity and shorten the length of the bust.40 Here too, 
each theory can concede some ground to the other, but the concessions 
are more grudging. Austrians sometimes see some role for limited aid to 
the unemployed to help tide them over. They also grant that very precise 
monetary policy may help prevent an overcorrection, but they highly 
doubt the ability of central banks to get that policy right.41 In turn, some 
Keynesians grant that stimuli and bailouts may stop some useful adjust-
ments from occurring and may help bolster inflation.42 But still, a (per-
haps the) defining difference between the two schools remains that Key-
nesians, even of the most skeptical sort, are far more willing to advocate 
monetary and fiscal stimulus policy during a recession than are Aus-
trians, even of the most moderate sort. 
IV. LIBERTARIANS 
During the Great Depression, a number of economists clung to a 
belief that markets, left to their own devices, would function well, and 
that government intervention would do more harm than good. One of the 
most prominent and brilliant of these was Friedrich Hayek.43 A problem 
for most economists of this ilk was that traditional economic theory 
could not really explain how the Great Depression could have occurred 
in the first place. The challenge was to devise a theory that gave a plaus-
ible, realistic account of markets while still concluding that state inter-
vention was unwarranted.44 That challenge remains today—the laissez-
faire-inclined new classical macroeconomics of recent decades resembles 
the traditional pre-Depression theory in being unable to adequately ex-
plain how such a contraction could ever occur.45 Over the course of the 
Great Depression, Hayek elaborated a theory of the business cycle that 
meets this challenge better than any competitor. That business cycle 
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theory began with Ludwig von Mises, and is known as Austrian business 
cycle theory. Subsequent economists in the tradition have elaborated on 
the theory,46 but Hayek remains the most influential exponent. 
In looking more closely at Austrian business cycle theory, we need 
to consider in greater detail both the claim that government monetary 
policy is responsible for creating recessions and the claim that govern-
ment intervention once a recession has begun will only make matters 
worse. Although these claims are not that different from policy ineffec-
tiveness claims in more mainstream libertarian economic theory, they are 
more poignant in the Austrian theory because markets are more fragile 
according to the Austrian theory, and, hence, the alleged governmental 
failure is more painful. Austrian theorists do not generally trumpet this 
market fragility, but it is there in the theory. In this Part, we will ask 
whether the Austrian claim of governmental ineffectiveness, and worse, 
holds up once one takes that market fragility seriously. 
The Austrian business cycle theory has roots in the capital theory of 
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk47 and Knut Wicksell.48 The first brief state-
ment of the theory was by Ludwig von Mises.49 Friedrich Hayek made 
the main formulation of the theory in the 1930s and used the theory to 
oppose active intervention in response to the Great Depression.50 The 
main post-World War II elaboration came from Murray Rothbard.51 A 
more recent neo-Austrian theory of the business cycle on which I shall 
draw quite a bit was developed by Tyler Cowen.52 
As we have seen,53 the Austrian theory blames expansive monetary 
policy for igniting the boom phase of a business cycle. Injection of mon-
ey into the economy through the banking system lowers interest rates and 
encourages investors in the more capital-intensive parts of the economy 
to increase their investments. These investments increase overall eco-
nomic activity. But some portion of the investments will turn out to be 
malinvestments, which will lead to the bust phase. 
But before turning to the bust phase, we must ask two questions 
about the boom. First, why do money growth and low interest rates cause 
investors to overinvest in long-term projects?54 Second, might other 
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causes lead to similar overinvestment? As to the first question, a more 
modern rational expectations approach considers the Austrian school 
suspect, since it requires investors to be systematically fooled by gov-
ernment policy into believing interest rates will remain low long enough 
for their long-term investments to turn a profit. One can counter this crit-
icism by replying that rational expectations are not a good assumption to 
make about long-term investments and financial markets—indeed, a 
more realistic understanding of expectations is one of the main attrac-
tions of Austrian theory.55 Yet Tyler Cowen has argued rather persua-
sively that even without the rational expectations assumptions, traditional 
Austrian theory implies that investors react to money-induced lowered 
interest rates in quite implausible ways.56 Contemporary Austrian theor-
ists have tried to rebut this criticism,57 while Cowen has reformulated 
and generalized the theory in a way that avoids his various specific criti-
cisms, including this one.58 
For my purposes here, I do not need to resolve this debate—the 
Austrian theory has challenges, as do all macroeconomic theories, but on 
at least some versions it still has some real attractions. The bigger ques-
tion for me is the second one posed above: Once we admit that financial 
markets can be destabilized by monetary policy, aren’t there other causes 
not tied to governmental intervention that could have the same effect of 
launching a doomed boom? If markets can be fooled by monetary policy 
in the way the Austrian theory describes, can’t other factors fool them as 
well? The basic source of the boom is widespread expectations about 
future returns that turn out to be mistaken and lead to miscoordination in 
the form of too much investment in long-term capital.59 Does the core 
theory justify the assumption that expansive monetary policy is the only 
important potential source of such expectations? Even worse for the 
theory, if there are such other sources, then might there be a role for 
countercyclical monetary policy to cut off speculative booms before they 
go too far? 
Before looking at how economists in the Austrian tradition have 
answered those questions, let us first consider similar questions that arise 
for the analysis of the bust phase of the business cycle. The bust begins 
once it becomes clear that the malinvestments went too far, leading to 
unprofitable new projects. Those industries must then cut back, reducing 
                                                 
 55. William Barnett II & Walter Block, Tyler Cowen on Austrian Business Cycle Theory: A 
Critique, 2 NEW PERSP. ON POL. ECON. 26, 31–32 (2006). 
 56. COWEN, supra note 26, at 80. 
 57. See generally Barnett & Block, supra note 55. 
 58. COWEN, supra note 26. 
 59. Id. at 11. 
2011] Of Mises and Min(sky) 1293 
production and jobs. Employees and capital must shift to other areas, and 
this shift can take a long time and cause painful dislocations in the 
process. The Austrian theory sees little room for governmental interven-
tion to ease the pain—the disinvesting needs to happen, and trying to 
ease it will simply delay the pain and lead to more pain in the end. They 
do leave open a theoretical possibility that intervention might help pre-
vent overshooting or reduce some reductions in demand outside of the 
affected industries that might occur. But they believe that it is highly un-
likely that governments will be able to find the right policies.60 
Given the severe and prolonged pain that the busts can cause, 
though, we should not too lightly accept the argument that there is noth-
ing that government can do to help. In particular, Keynesian theory raises 
the threat that industries throughout the economy will contract as every-
one becomes worried and cautious.61 That leads to a widespread waste of 
resources well beyond the disinvesting from overly expanded industries 
that the Austrian theory says is needed. At least some versions of Aus-
trian theory do allow for this possibility.62 Are they right that the possi-
bility is of limited importance and does not justify actual intervention to 
ease a recession? Thus, in the Austrian theory of both the boom and the 
bust, we find an acknowledgment of serious instability that can occur in 
part through the operation of financial markets. That instability arises 
because of the difficulty market participants have in predicting the fu-
ture—it is an ignorance-based source of possible distrust of the market, 
in our ignorance v. greed categorization. And this source of distrust of 
markets is quite close to the distrust that arises from Keynesian theory. 
How do the key Austrian theorists react to this possible time bomb 
lurking within their story? Deep distrust of governmental intervention in 
markets is a core commitment for them, and yet their theory suggests 
serious dysfunction within a crucial set of markets. I distinguish four 
strands of responses: Panglossian, anti-banking, pessimistic, and coward-
ly interventionist. 
The Panglossian response is that the potential for instability within 
markets in the absence of active governmental intervention is quite li-
mited and, hence, not a big worry. In a libertarian utopia of private cur-
rencies and a night-watchman state, there might be mild booms and 
busts, but they would not do too much harm. There are elements of this 
response in Mises63 and Rothbard,64 for instance. The story behind this is 
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that other than central banks, no other actor is systematically able to 
create the kind of distorted expectations that lead to the boom. Absent 
inflationary monetary policy, investor expectations will usually more or 
less cancel out on the optimistic and pessimistic side,65 and the false 
booms will be relatively rare and mild. The private banking system 
could, on its own, through heightened lending, inflate the money supply. 
But the Panglossian view maintains that without central bank facilitation, 
the banks could not go too far, as depositor and creditor monitoring of 
bank debt levels would limit excessive bank leverage.66 This theory, at 
least in its more extreme forms, advocates in monetary policy the elimi-
nation of central banks combined with a return to the gold standard or 
private banking and private currencies,67 in fiscal policy a very small 
state68 and, hence, very little fiscal policy at all, and in financial regula-
tion only minimal rules. 
But the story underlying this version of the theory looks lazy and 
unjustified. There is serious incoherence in the Panglossian version’s 
treatment of investor expectations. Government monetary intervention is 
assumed to seriously mislead investors, and yet when it comes to possi-
ble private sources of a boom–bust cycle, the theory assumes that expec-
tations will not go very wrong. Keynesian theory, and especially 
Minsky’s version of Keynes, provides a compelling story about how vo-
latile expectations can coordinate in an optimistic crescendo for a long 
time.69 Real business cycle theory also suggests that real changes in the 
economy may change expectations, but that investors may sometimes not 
correctly understand the effect of those changes at first. In his generaliza-
tion of Austrian theory, Cowen has monetary policy as just one of five 
types of causes for expectations leading to a boom.70 Hayek and his fol-
lowers, for the most part, seem to have been unwilling to follow the logic 
of their theory as far as it goes when that logic leads to too much distrust 
of financial markets.71 
A second Austrian response to the possibility of fragility within the 
private financial system is a denunciation of fractional reserve banking.72 
This response is particularly associated with Murray Rothbard. Although 
Rothbard primarily blames central banks for the boom–bust cycle and 
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advocates the same sort of extremes in laissez-faire monetary, fiscal, and 
regulatory policy, he also argues that fractional reserve banking exacer-
bates the problem. Through fractional reserve banking, private banks in 
effect increase the money supply, and by increasing leverage or decreas-
ing reserves, they can inflate the economy. Moreover, fractional reserve 
banking creates the possibility of bank runs, which make busts more 
sudden and severe.73 
Rothbard’s response is to advocate prohibiting fractional reserve 
banking.74 This is an odd position for someone who is generally fiercely 
libertarian. Rothbard attempts to justify this major state intervention by 
arguing that fractional reserve banking is fraud, as it requires committing 
the same property to multiple persons.75 
As a policy prescription, this is hard to take seriously, for reasons 
that should have been obvious to a libertarian economist like Rothbard. 
The fraud argument should be immediately dubious to any first-year law 
student—a necessary element of fraud is deception, and banks do not 
hide the basic nature of what they do. Moreover, the political odds of 
Rothbard’s proposal succeeding are indistinguishable from zero—banks 
would fight it with everything they have. Worst of all, anyone familiar 
with one of Hayek’s best arguments against intrusive regulation76 would 
see that although banning fractional reserve banking is simple to state as 
an idea, it would be horrendously hard to actually translate into an enfor-
ceable law. As we see from the current shadow banking system, there are 
many ways to behave economically like a bank without calling oneself a 
bank.77 There are huge profits to be had from doing what fractional re-
serve banks do, and firms would find all sorts of creative ways to get 
around the law. Any attempt to ban fractional reserve banking would 
indeed lead down the road to serfdom. 
While not possible to take seriously as a practical policy proposal, 
Rothbard’s case against the banks is a telling moment in Austrian busi-
ness cycle theory. Its very implausibility, almost silliness, and its deep 
inconsistency with the libertarian thrust of most of that theory, is reveal-
ing. An intelligent and usually rigorously consistent theorist like Roth-
bard is likely to fall into such a trap only when there is a deep hole within 
that theory, a tension between competing principles that the theory finds 
impossible to resolve convincingly. Although Rothbard in many places 
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follows the Panglossian response, when he attacks private banks he is 
recognizing a deep fragility within the market system. As much as possi-
ble he tries to blame that fragility on central banks and regulation, but 
here he more honestly confronts the dilemma of a libertarian approach to 
business cycles and the financial markets. But his intellectual honesty 
falters in his lack of serious scrutiny of his proposed solution. 
The third possible Austrian response to the threat of instability 
within the financial system is pessimistic. It recognizes the possibility, 
indeed likelihood, of truly deep and long-lasting busts in an unregulated 
system, but insists government intervention would just make things even 
worse. The policy prescriptions, at least in strong versions, remain as 
fiercely libertarian (without the odd ban on fractional reserve banking) as 
the first two responses. One sees elements of this pessimistic response in 
Hayek and Rothbard. One important step in this direction is Rothbard’s 
recognition of “secondary” features of the bust phase. Although he in-
sists that the unwinding of malinvestments remains the primary feature, 
he notes that as financial difficulties and bankruptcies increase, over-
leveraged banks and businesses may choose to behave very cautiously. 
Customers and creditors may become worried about banks, leading to 
possibly contagious bank runs. Given all these risks, people prefer to 
hold more money and fewer risky assets.78 
These are the main features of a Keynesian story about the bust 
phase, particularly as developed in Minsky (as we shall see in the next 
Part).79 It is unclear what Rothbard intends by labeling them “secondary” 
features. Perhaps this is a matter of logic—the theory points to the un-
winding of malinvestments as the key point. But even if secondary in 
that sense, that does not prevent such secondary features from becoming 
extremely important in practice. If Rothbard means to deny such practic-
al importance, he gives no good arguments or evidence for accepting that 
denial. 
A pessimistic version of the Austrian theory would grant the great 
importance of these features and, hence, would grant that busts may be 
much more painful than the Panglossian version of the theory suggests. 
But it would insist that we must just live through the pain. This fits with 
a certain form of moralistic austerity rhetoric that one can find both in 
Hayek in the 1930s80 and also in many observers today.81 But given the 
recognition of how badly unregulated markets may fare, this pessimism 
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requires a stronger theory of why governmental intervention is likely to 
do more harm than good. 
If financial markets on their own may lead to serious inflationary 
bubbles, is there not then a role for monetary policy, fiscal policy, or 
regulation to contain those bubbles? The pessimistic theory has both ig-
norance-based and greed-based arguments against such intervention. As 
to the former, one can seriously question whether bureaucrats are likely 
to be able to recognize asset bubbles before the market does. And even if 
they can identify a bubble, they may not be able to stop it without caus-
ing the very recession they want to avert. This was the leading argument 
that the libertarian Alan Greenspan used to resist suggestions that he 
should try to prick the housing bubble that led to the latest crisis.82 Bu-
reaucrats are likely to be at least as subject to imperfect knowledge as are 
sophisticated financial markets. 
The greed-based case against intervention is developed through 
public choice theory. Even if bureaucrats and politicians have the wis-
dom to recognize the economy is in the midst of an inflationary boom, 
they will face great political pressure to let it continue. Contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policy lead to immediate felt pain for many, and that 
pain has to be justified with the assertion that things would have been 
even worse had the boom been allowed to continue.83 Such counterfac-
tuals are rarely politically compelling, even when true. Almost every-
one—financiers, consumers, workers—benefits during the boom phase. 
Fighting almost everyone is not easy, and even well-designed governing 
institutions may be unable to do so regularly. 
How about intervention during the bust phase? Clearly this can help 
ease some of the pain. But it does so at great costs, the pessimists claim. 
These costs include both putting off needed liquidation of failed compa-
nies and investments and also the moral hazard created by financial mar-
kets being aware that government will bail them out when things go 
wrong.84 Interventions may also generate policy uncertainty, which can 
delay recovery.85 Also, once intervention is allowed, government may 
well intervene even in many instances where there is little risk of system-
ic collapse. 
For all these reasons, a pessimistic version of the Austrian theory 
grants that financial markets left to their own devices will cause serious 
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problems but maintains that the cure of governmental intervention is 
worse than the disease. It advocates building barriers to such interven-
tion. Here, though, it faces a difficulty—the very public choice argu-
ments which suggest that intervention is likely to be unhelpful also sug-
gest that it is likely to be unavoidable, particularly now that we have 
created institutions with the power to do so. Undoing those institutions 
may very well be politically completely infeasible, not only because 
there are strong entrenched interests that benefit from those institutions, 
but also because the benefits from a pure laissez-faire approach are high-
ly uncertain, and on this version of the theory we know the costs are 
high.86 So, the pessimistic version of the theory is very likely doomed to 
a lonely Cassandra position, and knows itself to be so. 
Unlike the first two responses to financial market fragility, I find 
the pessimistic approach quite plausible, although ultimately I do not 
follow it for reasons developed below. It very much deserves to be a ma-
jor part of the conversation as to how to respond to the role of finance in 
boom–bust cycles. 
The final possible Austrian approach to addressing the fragility of 
financial markets fits within what I elsewhere call advocacy of cowardly 
interventions.87 This response moves considerably towards the Keyne-
sian position and is less rigorously libertarian than the other three res-
ponses. Like the anti-banking and pessimistic responses, it recognizes the 
deep fragility of laissez-faire financial markets. Unlike the anti-banking 
response, though, it does not go down the rather goofy path of trying to 
eliminate fractional reserve banking. Unlike the pessimistic response, it 
does grudgingly grant the wisdom for some government interventions, in 
monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy. It does so because it recognizes 
the threat that financial markets pose if left alone and that doing nothing 
in the face of depressions is politically unpalatable. 
This more pragmatic approach may be divided into two variants. 
One agrees with the pessimists that on-balance governmental interven-
tion is likely to make matters worse, but because it also sees some inter-
vention as inevitable, it enters the fray to try to keep that intervention as 
unobjectionable as possible. The other variant is concerned enough with 
the instability of markets that it believes that on balance it is possible for 
governmental interventions to do more good than harm. Both variants 
agree that there should be strong limits on the extent of interventions. 
We can find elements of this pragmatic approach occasionally in 
Hayek’s writings. A good example is his qualified support for central 
                                                 
 86. McDonnell, supra note 10, at 31. 
 87. See generally McDonnell, supra note 10. 
2011] Of Mises and Min(sky) 1299 
banks following discretionary monetary policy.88 Tyler Cowen’s neo-
Austrian approach is rather more consistently pragmatic. In the recent 
crisis, he supported at least elements of the Dodd-Frank financial reform 
and the bank bailouts.89 He also had some sympathy for a fiscal policy 
operating through automatic stabilizers,90 although much less so for dis-
cretionary fiscal policy.91 In Part VI, I will lay out in more detail what 
cowardly interventionist monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies might 
look like, and how Austrian and Keynesian versions of such an approach 
will differ. In general, we will see that even the most pragmatic of Aus-
trians (like Cowen) will differ from even the most pragmatic of Keyne-
sians in emphasizing that governmental interventions should remain 
quite limited. 
V. LIBERALS 
The Roosevelt administration set the pattern for active governmen-
tal interventions in response to the boom–bust cycle. Through jobs and 
welfare programs it created a modest fiscal stimulus, though spending 
did not reach the level suggested by economists like Keynes until the 
ramp-up to World War II. It introduced a whole new system of financial 
institution and market regulation in a variety of pieces of legislation, 
above all the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. It moved the United States away 
from the gold standard, creating the basis for a new form of monetary 
policy.92 
Roosevelt himself was a pragmatic improviser. His policies did not 
necessarily flow from a consistent philosophy of public policy. Yet here I 
shall explore some of the leading intellectual justifications for Roose-
velt’s liberal approach, both justifications made during the Great Depres-
sion and also subsequent developments within this tradition. I distinguish 
two strands within this tradition. One focuses on problems created in fi-
nancial markets by ignorance and uncertainty, while the other focuses on 
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problems created by greed and corruption. For reasons discussed in the 
Introduction,93 I focus on the former. 
The towering achievement in the liberal tradition from the Great 
Depression is Keynes’s General Theory.94 Published in 1936, it postdates 
the main New Deal legislation and programs. But Keynes circulated his 
ideas in preliminary form before the book came out, and other econo-
mists advocated similar policies. A leading justification for such policies 
and a related explanation for business cycles was Irving Fisher’s debt 
deflation theory, published in 1933.95 Keynes’s theory focused on the 
role of uncertainty in destabilizing financial markets. In response, he ad-
vocated countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy to slow down booms 
before they turned into busts, and to reduce the depth and length of busts 
when they did occur. Keynes’s position on financial regulation is less 
clear, although the work of successors like Minsky makes clearer the role 
for regulation in stabilizing financial markets.96 
Keynesian theory does not work well to justify all elements of the 
New Deal response. In particular, the focus of the new securities laws on 
transparency and avoiding fraud does not seem to flow particularly well 
from a Keynesian analysis of the problems markets face. Rather, that part 
of the New Deal seems to spring from another liberal tradition that em-
phasizes the role of greed and deception within financial markets. A 
leading articulation of this view is Louis Brandeis’s Other People’s 
Money.97 I will discuss more below some roles this plays in the develop-
ment of the liberal approach to financial regulation, but first I shall focus 
on the Keynesian tradition. 
After the war, Keynesian theory developed in a variety of direc-
tions. A mainstream set of economists, led by Paul Samuelson among 
others, crafted a tamed version that was easier to reconcile with tradi-
tional economics.98 More interesting for my purposes are the post-
Keynesians, who emphasized the role of uncertainty and expectations. Of 
these, the most important is Hyman Minsky.99 Whereas Keynes focused 
mainly on the bust phase of the business cycle, Minsky focused at least 
as much on the boom phase. 
                                                 
 93. See supra paragraph before note 10. 
 94. See generally KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY, 
supra note 8. 
 95. See generally Irving Fisher, The Debt–Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 
ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933). 
 96. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 354–58. 
 97. See generally BRANDEIS, supra note 27. 
 98. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1948). 
 99. See generally MINSKY, sources cited supra note 8. 
2011] Of Mises and Min(sky) 1301 
As developed by Minsky, the post-Keynesian theory resembles 
Austrian business cycle theory in important ways. In the boom phase, 
overly optimistic investor expectations lead to a high level of capital in-
vestments. This appears both in rising stock market prices and, even 
more seriously, in rising levels of debt. Both banks and operating com-
panies become more and more leveraged, and increasing numbers of ac-
tors take on levels of debt that can be repaid only on optimistic assump-
tions about future profits.100 A crucial difference from the Austrian 
theory, though, is that inflationary monetary policy from the central bank 
is far from the only way that such an inflationary boom can start. Indeed, 
in Minsky’s theory, even without inflationary monetary policy, the na-
ture of investor expectations is likely to lead to a boom eventually, as 
periods of calmness and prosperity lead investors to forget the threat of 
bad times and become willing to take on more risk (or rather, to become 
less aware of the risk they are creating with their ever-more-leveraged 
investments).101 
The resulting boom is unsustainable. Eventually, bad news of some 
sort will cause investors to start to question their rosy scenarios. It be-
comes hard to maintain interest payments on all of those leveraged in-
vestments, as profits prove less high than expected. Expectations quickly 
turn negative. Businesses start to cut back as they try to handle their 
debts. Banks come under increasing pressure, and (in the absence of go-
vernmental intervention) bank runs start to occur. These can become 
contagious: Businesses cutting back leads to increased unemployment 
and lowered incomes, which causes consumers to cut back, which further 
reduces profits, which leads to a vicious downward cycle.102 These are 
both the primary and the secondary effects identified in Rothbard’s anal-
ysis of the bust phase.103 The collapse of business and demand is deeper 
and potentially longer-lasting than in the core Austrian theory; although 
we have seen that in various places the Austrians recognize the elements 
that can lead to this broader collapse. 
Because it sees this bust phase as more severe and the boom phase 
as more endogenous to financial markets themselves, the post-Keynesian 
theory is more inclined to advocate governmental intervention than the 
Austrian theory. During good times, monetary, fiscal, and regulatory pol-
icy can help dampen the inflationary boom. During bad times, policies 
can help reduce the severity and length of the contraction.104 The more 
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seriously one sees markets as failing, the more likely one is to see a posi-
tive role for governmental interventions to address those failures, ceteris 
paribus. 
This theory goes further than the Austrian theory in rejecting the ra-
tionality of investor preferences. As we have seen, the Austrian theory 
takes a rather uncomfortable, inconsistent position between standard 
theories assuming strong rationality and a position which forthrightly 
rejects that assumption. The post-Keynesian approach abjures this mid-
dle ground and rejects the rationality assumption, which has dominated 
most macroeconomics in recent decades. Recent developments in eco-
nomic theory support the post-Keynesian approach. Behavioral theories 
of economics and finance consider extensive psychological evidence on 
human decision-making and try to construct more realistic models of 
behavior based on that evidence.105 A recent book by Akerlof and Shiller 
explicitly ties these developments to Keynesian theory.106 
But a thorough application of behavioralism starts raising embar-
rassing questions for the post-Keynesian approach once one starts apply-
ing behavioral ideas to governmental actors, i.e., legislators and bureau-
crats. Will they not be subject to the same sorts of misplaced enthusiasms 
that distort markets? The Keynesian theory calls for the central bank and 
financial regulators to pull back during an incipient boom—to take away 
the punch just as the party gets going, to use the memorable metaphor of 
a former Federal Reserve chief.107 But if the central bank and regulators 
are subject to the same optimism based on forgetting past hard times, 
why should we expect them to play that role? Indeed, won’t they give in 
to the same enthusiasm and add oil to the fire, loosening monetary policy 
and financial regulators precisely when they should tighten? If so, then 
doesn’t government run a serious risk of exacerbating rather than dam-
pening the business cycle?108 
The greed-based variant of liberalism also saw significant theoreti-
cal developments in recent decades. The development of theories of 
asymmetric information identified many significant market failures. 
Eventually theorists started applying these ideas to macroeconomic prob-
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lems, providing new arguments to defend elements of Keynesian theory. 
Joseph Stiglitz was a central figure in developing both the microeconom-
ic and the macroeconomic theory.109 Fraud and poor corporate gover-
nance can lead to financial markets that perform quite inefficiently and 
may break down. Exponents of this brand of Keynesian indeed argued 
that one could support Keynesian business cycle theory and policy pre-
scriptions without recourse to the kind of rationality assumptions that 
post-Keynesian theory used.110 
But here too, the Keynesian approach faces embarrassment when 
one starts to apply these ideas to government policymaking itself. Will 
regulators have access to the information needed to correct market im-
perfections? Even if they do, will private actors who benefit from private 
information stand by and allow the government to reduce their power? 
Straightforward economic thinking, developed within public choice 
theory, suggests these parties will lobby legislators and regulators to 
shape rules in ways that help them. During the boom period, financial 
market interests will lobby to limit or eliminate rules meant to rein them 
in. When busts hit, they will lobby government to rescue them from their 
folly. These rescues are a part of the Keynesian prescription anyway, but 
political pressure will prevent the government from disciplining those 
who created the crisis. The prospect and past reality of these bailouts 
create a severe moral hazard problem. Minsky himself was highly con-
scious that market actors will tend to find ways around attempts to regu-
late them,111 and that governmental rescues reduced market discipline.112 
Postwar history provides much evidence to reinforce these doubts 
that arise within the Keynesian approach. The Keynesian golden age 
ended in the 1970s as inflation became a severe problem. Governmental 
efforts to prevent busts reduced market discipline and prevented needed 
disinvestments from occurring. As the Great Depression became a distant 
memory and postwar depressions were short and mild, market partici-
pants argued that restrictive old rules were no longer necessary. Deregu-
lation proceeded from the 1970s on. Government debt increased through 
much (though not all) of the period, as politicians found it easy to follow 
the Keynesian prescription favoring deficit spending during the bust 
phase but much harder to follow its prescription of surpluses during the 
boom. As for monetary policy, although it did manage to break the back 
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of inflation during the hard Volcker recession of the early 1980s, under 
Alan Greenspan markets came to believe in the “Greenspan put”—if fi-
nancial markets began to flag, he would lower interest rates to avoid a 
serious recession.113 The Greenspan put probably helped fuel the asset 
bubbles first in Internet stock and then in housing. The latter led directly 
to the recent financial crisis. 
How can and should Keynesians respond to the ability of the gov-
ernment to properly intervene to reduce the volatility of business cycles? 
Within advocates of that position, one can identify several kinds of res-
ponses. One sort of response is rather naive. It points to a variety of poli-
cy mistakes that regulators have made and asserts they would not have 
made such mistakes if they had just followed the right theory or had in 
place someone smart enough to make the right decisions—someone as 
smart, presumably, as the writer himself. This sort of response is also 
quite aware of the public choice issues and decries the influence of fi-
nancial market firms over regulators and policymakers. If only officials 
were more pure in their dedication to the public good (again, like the 
writer himself), the proper Keynesian policy would prevail. Joseph Stig-
litz’s popular writings often exhibit the characteristics of this kind of re-
sponse,114 as do the writings of Paul Krugman.115 
A more hardline liberal response calls for quite heavy financial reg-
ulation, in part to prevent bubbles, but even more to reduce the political 
power of financial institutions. The recent book Thirteen Bankers by Si-
mon Johnson and James Kwak is a good example of this genre.116 John-
son and Kwak focus on the great political power of large Wall Street 
firms, like Goldman Sachs, and blame them for the deregulation that led 
to the crisis and then for the bailouts, which treated the banks far too 
gently. They argue that law should prevent firms from becoming too big 
to fail and set hard limits on the size of financial businesses. Some liber-
als go even further and argue for resurrecting the strict price and entry 
limits that characterized finance in the 1950s and 1960s. 
These kind of heavy regulations raise a serious question as to 
whether they go too far in limiting financial innovation.117 Worse still, 
contemporary analysis in this genre tends not to have much in the way of 
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a convincing story as to how we are supposed to get there. It seems to 
hope that populist outrage in the wake of a crisis will lead to support for 
breaking up the banks. But it tends not to do a detailed, realistic political 
analysis that identifies forces that can plausibly support a sustained as-
sault on the powerful financial sector. Indeed, one can often detect a cy-
nicism and despair that suggests a realization of how unlikely such regu-
lation is. The very concentrated political power that gives rise to a need 
for such regulation also makes it extremely unlikely.118 Insofar as they 
recognize their weakness in the face of existing forces, these sorts of lib-
erals rather closely resemble the pessimistic Austrians.119 
A more pragmatic response puts some Keynesians within the realm 
of what I call cowardly interventionism, thereby joining the most prag-
matic of the Austrian theorists. Such Keynesians look for ways to loosen 
the bounds on the rationality of policymakers,120 but they recognize that 
bounded rationality for all is here to stay. They therefore call for less ac-
tive governmental intervention of various kinds. The political limits on 
responsible intervention also lead such Keynesians to expect less from 
the government and explore ways in which policymakers can, to a de-
gree, be shielded from undue political influence.121 
Keynesians of this sort may in their policy advocacy look more like 
the most pragmatic Austrians than like the more hardline Keynesians. 
Current economists within this strain include figures like Brad Delong122 
and Larry Summers.123 Still, even within the confines of a pragmatic, 
cowardly interventionist spectrum, one will still see differences between 
the Austrians and the Keynesians. The Keynesians are still animated by 
great distrust of the effect of financial markets on the business cycle and 
are inclined to push governmental intervention further than the Austrians 
with their ancestral distrust of government. 
Thus, in the last two Parts we have seen some theorists within two 
very different traditions come together. Family resemblances in their 
theories of the business cycle helped create some possibility of a joint 
vision. Beyond that, the experience of history has taught painful lessons 
to both sides. The libertarians started with a great distrust of the govern-
ment and believed that markets worked well enough that they should be 
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left largely alone. But experience revealed deep enough problems with 
markets that some libertarians came to reluctantly recognize a need for 
fairly serious intervention to stabilize markets. The liberals started with a 
great distrust of financial markets and believed that government could do 
a lot to stabilize those markets and prevent macroeconomic instability. 
But experience revealed deep enough problems with governments that 
some liberals came to reluctantly recognize that we should be very skep-
tical about how much government can do to stabilize the economy. Still, 
although some within the two sides have moved towards the middle, 
echoes from their starting points remain, leaving much source of division 
even where there is significant common ground. 
VI. COWARDLY INTERVENTIONS 
In the previous two Parts, I have shown how good reasons for dis-
trusting both markets and governments can lead to convergence from 
very different starting points on a program of what I call cowardly inter-
ventions. In this Part, I sketch what such a program looks like. I consider 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, and financial regulation. In a companion 
Article,124 I have looked in much more detail than I can consider here at 
financial regulation and, in particular, the Dodd-Frank Act. Here, I will 
do more than I do in that piece to consider monetary and fiscal policy 
along with financial regulation. 
There tends to be a division of labor in academic treatment of these 
topics, with economists addressing monetary and fiscal policy and legal 
scholars addressing financial regulation. That division makes a good deal 
of sense, but it can be taken too far. The three sets of policies are inter-
related. Each can be used to help dampen inflationary booms. The poli-
cies can act as substitutes. Hence, they should not be considered each in 
isolation but together. Economists are well aware that is so for monetary 
and fiscal policy, but financial regulation tends to be treated separately 
from the other two. Here, I treat all three together. 
A. Monetary Policy 
While the more extreme within the Austrian camp condemn central 
banks altogether,125 and some of them call for a return to the gold stan-
dard or for competing private currencies,126 over the last few decades 
there has been a convergence within mainstream economics on the basic 
features of sound monetary policy. The cowardly interventionist ap-
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proach fits within that mainstream. But the financial crisis has raised 
some hard questions. 
One constantly recurring struggle over monetary policy concerns 
the relative weight to be given to curbing inflation and promoting eco-
nomic growth as often conflicting goals. Given the inflationary bias of 
policy driven by more politically accountable organs of government, it 
makes sense for the central bank to be particularly concerned with infla-
tion.127 One would expect those coming from an Austrian starting point 
to have greater concern about inflation than those coming from a Keyne-
sian starting point. Some argue that inflation should be the sole concern 
of the central bank in setting monetary policy.128 But the financial crisis 
suggests that is not such a good idea. Since our economy is obviously 
still subject to the possibility of severe contractions, we should not forget 
the importance of avoiding such contractions. But the more that fiscal 
and regulatory policy do to help guard against such contractions, the less 
we need to use monetary policy for that purpose—an instance of the im-
portance of considering these three areas of policy together. 
A particular problem in the inflation–growth tradeoff revealed over 
the past decade concerns the role of asset bubbles. First, during the dot-
com bubble and then during the housing bubble, the Federal Reserve 
faced a question that generated much debate. Inflation as usually meas-
ured was low, suggesting little need for a tight monetary policy. But 
many were concerned that an expansive policy was fueling the asset 
bubbles and, hence, that policy should be made less expansive in order to 
prick those bubbles. Alan Greenspan as Chair of the Fed seems to have 
been torn by this question but ultimately decided that the Fed should not 
use monetary policy to try to stop asset bubbles.129 Two main arguments 
appear to have swayed him and others. First, it is hard to recognize bub-
bles while one is in them. Even if, like the Austrians and Keynesians we 
have considered here, one does not accept strong theories of market effi-
ciency,130 someone like Greenspan with a libertarian bent is going to be 
reluctant to think he can systematically and successfully second-guess 
market valuations of assets. Second, Greenspan argued that it made most 
sense to let the bubbles run their course and deal with the effects of their 
bursting afterward.131 
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The financial crisis has called those arguments into question. Even 
if central bankers cannot be sure that their judgment is better than the 
market’s on the existence of a bubble, there are indicators that fairly reli-
ably suggest that a bubble may exist.132 Many warned about the housing 
bubble several years before it popped.133 It is now quite obvious that 
waiting until a bubble bursts to deal with the consequences is a danger-
ous strategy. Thus, it may well be that central banks should consider po-
tential asset bubbles and be willing to use monetary policy to prick them 
when there is good reason to believe that a bubble exists and poses a se-
rious threat to the economy. On the other hand, Greenspan’s reasons for 
not using monetary policy to address asset bubbles do still have real 
force. Perhaps countercyclical financial regulation provides a more fo-
cused and effective way to address asset bubbles. If so, then it may be 
there is little or no need to use monetary policy to address bubbles, or 
perhaps one should do so only in the case of the biggest of bubbles. Inte-
restingly, it may well be that a Keynesian is more willing to use mone-
tary policy to address asset bubbles than someone from the Austrian tra-
dition, despite the latter’s usual greater concern with inflation. If central 
banks start using monetary policy to deflate asset bubbles, they will have 
greater discretion and become more involved in second-guessing market 
valuations, both of which are suspect from an Austrian perspective. And 
yet that perspective also focuses on the dangers of asset bubbles. This is 
a hard question for both groups within our pragmatic middle way. 
The other great dilemma of monetary policy raised by the financial 
crisis concerns its role in the midst of the crisis. The Federal Reserve 
took quite aggressive action to keep the economy from collapsing, in-
cluding large purchases and guarantees of assets well beyond the short-
term government bonds that constitute its asset portfolio in ordinary 
times. The wisdom and effectiveness of those actions will continue to be 
debated for many years. They may have helped save the economy from a 
Second Great Depression, but they also exposed the Federal Reserve and 
the U.S. Treasury to potentially huge liabilities134 and created severe 
moral hazard problems as financial industry participants were spared the 
full pain of their mistakes.135 Here, there is an interaction with fiscal pol-
icy—one will see less need for aggressive monetary policy in a crisis the 
more that one believes that fiscal policy is likely to be effective. Presum-
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ably, almost all would agree that these tools should only be used in ex-
treme circumstances. The experience of the crisis does also suggest, 
though, that in such extreme circumstances, the tools may be useful. 
B. Fiscal Policy 
Keynes himself put the greatest stress on fiscal policy during se-
rious economic contractions. But in recent decades, most economists 
have become rather skeptical, at least of discretionary fiscal policy. 
There are two concerns, familiar from our discussion already, about a 
policy that is controlled by elected politicians.136 First, those politicians 
may well not recognize when fiscal stimulus is needed, especially given 
the lag time in such policy’s operation. Second, politicians will be 
tempted to use deficits during contractions, but not to follow Keynes and 
institute surpluses during expansions.137 The long-term result is structural 
deficits that fuel inflation and may eventually lead to budgetary crises.138 
Because of these concerns, most economists favor automatic stabi-
lizers over discretionary fiscal policy.139 Automatic stabilizers work, as 
the name suggests, automatically, and depend less upon the discretion 
and judgment of legislators. As the economy contracts, benefit programs 
like unemployment insurance lead to increased expenditures, while gov-
ernment income contracts as tax revenues decrease. 
What is the appropriate level of automatic stabilizers? The current 
level in the United States is below that of most other advanced econo-
mies, in part because the general level of spending is lower in the United 
States and in part because its tax and spending are less redistributive. The 
question of the right level is hard not only because of differences be-
tween libertarians and liberals over the degree of appropriate activism in 
macroeconomic policy, but even more because many other sorts of poli-
cy debates enter into the creation of the government’s budget. The ques-
tions obviously go well beyond those at issue in this Article. Liberals and 
libertarians tend to disagree strongly on those questions as well, with 
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liberals tending to advocate higher spending in many areas (though not 
all, defense spending being a major exception to the general trend).140 
The higher the level of automatic stabilizers, the less need there will 
be for discretionary fiscal policy to address even severe contractions. 
This can be seen in comparing the U.S. and German reactions to the re-
cent crisis. The United States under Barack Obama had a much larger 
discretionary stimulus response, but the total level of deficit spending (as 
a percentage of GNP) in response to the crisis was about the same, due to 
the larger automatic stabilizers in Germany.141 This creates something of 
a dilemma for a moderate libertarian within the cowardly interventionist 
fold. On the one hand, as a libertarian, one will tend to advocate low 
general levels of government spending, with resulting low automatic sta-
bilizers. On the other hand, when a crisis hits, one will also strongly pre-
fer automatic stabilizers to discretionary stimulus.142 That may lead to 
support for somewhat more government spending than one would other-
wise want or to supporting more active monetary policy than one would 
otherwise want. 
Is there any room for discretionary fiscal stimulus during a crisis? 
That became a point of heated debate in the early weeks of the Obama 
Administration. Here, even Austrians and Keynesians who fall within the 
cowardly interventionist fold are likely to disagree, with the Austrians 
quite skeptical of discretionary stimulus and the Keynesians likely to 
support a fair degree of stimulus.143 In between is an intermediate level 
of stimulus likely to make few people really happy—this is precisely 
what was enacted in those early weeks of the Obama Administration. 
C. Financial Regulation 
Financial regulation can also help stabilize the financial sector and, 
hence, the economy. During boom periods, it can restrain lending, dam-
pening the sort of speculation that both Austrians and Keynesians see as 
the cause of the eventual bust. During bust periods, central banks or other 
government agencies can act as lenders of last resort, bailing out or help-
ing to shut down in an orderly way failing financial institutions and, the-
reby, preventing runs and panics. Yet the growing complexity of finance 
makes appropriate regulation ever harder to create and enforce, and the 
politics of regulatory capture create ongoing doubts about the likelihood 
that agencies will be adequately vigilant. 
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Extreme Austrians advocate very light to no financial regulation, 
while extreme Keynesians advocate much stronger limits than we cur-
rently see, along the lines that prevailed in the early postwar decades. 
Here, though, I shall briefly lay out an intermediate position. I have ana-
lyzed this in much greater detail in my Article on cowardly interven-
tions.144 
Bailing out failing financial institutions is the most direct and ob-
vious way to stop panics, and has been a feature of central banking for 
centuries.145 The lender of last resort guarantee can be explicit or impli-
cit, limited or expansive, and the government may charge an advance fee 
to build up a bailout fund or not. One can see elements of both in the 
U.S. financial system. For banks covered by the FDIC, the guarantee is 
explicit, limited to deposits under a certain size (although there may be 
some indeterminate implicit guarantee for amounts above that level as 
well), and backed by a fund into which banks pay premia. This system 
creates a great deal of certainty, and to the extent the FDIC can make 
premia risk based with an effective measurement of risk, it helps force 
banks to internalize the risk they take.146 For other financial institutions, 
the guarantee is implicit and, hence, uncertain—but the recent crisis re-
veals that the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury are ready to go quite far 
in honoring their implicit guarantee. The Dodd-Frank Act extended reso-
lution authority so that now the government can orderly resolve a wider 
range of financial institutions. Due to Republican opposition, no new 
guarantee fund was created. The concern was that such a fund would in-
crease the chances of an inappropriate bailout, but as a consequence the 
government can’t charge risk-based premia that could have helped to 
internalize risk.147 
There is plenty of room to debate the proper approach to rescues of 
financial institutions, and how far the United States is from such an ap-
proach as revealed by the recent crisis. Few people can be fully satisfied 
with how the bailouts worked in the crisis. Our reflections on the perils 
surrounding governmental intervention suggest that future crises will 
continue to reveal plentiful problems in governmental responses. But 
some bailouts are virtually inevitable. There is also a fair amount to 
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praise in the reaction to the latest crisis,148 and, as we shall see next, the 
new resolution authority in Dodd-Frank probably gives improved tools 
for handling the next crisis. Those operating within a cowardly interven-
tionist approach have plenty of room for debate about major details in 
how we approach rescues, but they can agree on the basic need for them. 
Although sometimes needed, the prospect of rescues creates moral 
hazard that can increase the amount of risk that financial institutions un-
dertake. Thoughtful intervention needs to find ways to alleviate the prob-
lem that intervention creates.149 The New Deal banking legislation faced 
this problem when it created FDIC insurance and responded with two 
main mitigation strategies. Resolution authority allows the FDIC to im-
pose some discipline when it does intervene, and bank capital require-
ments and supervision regulates ex ante the amount of risk that banks can 
undertake. The Dodd-Frank Act contains both elements as well, although 
it remains to be seen whether it will work as well as the New Deal legis-
lation.150 
With an effective resolution authority, bank regulators can recreate 
much of the discipline of unregulated markets. When a bank fails, they 
can try to make sure that bank shareholders and top officers lose out, so 
fear of that punishment motivates future bank shareholders and officers. 
Bank creditors need more protection in order to prevent panics, but per-
haps unsecured creditors can and should receive reduced payments in 
some circumstances to give them incentive to better monitor banks in the 
future. The FDIC’s resolution authority has performed these functions 
well since the New Deal. But as the financial sector has grown more 
complicated, more and more institutions and markets are not covered by 
the FDIC. Shadow banking institutions functionally closely resemble 
banks but are not regulated as banks.151 These institutions need interven-
tion along lines similar to the New Deal banking legislation. The new 
resolution authority in Dodd-Frank152 extends resolution authority to sys-
temically important nonbank financial institutions. The law dictates that 
shareholders and officers should be punished in the process and leaves 
for further study and discretion the treatment of unsecured creditors, all 
as it should. A critical question that will be determined by future regula-
tion and bailouts is whether the Act goes far enough in covering the main 
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participants in the shadow banking world. Unfortunately, there is good 
reason to believe that the legislation covers too limited a realm, focusing 
on too-big-to-fail companies, but creative regulation could extend the 
authority further.153 There is also a good argument to be made that a 
modified version of Chapter 11 bankruptcy rather than a new resolution 
authority would have been a better response—Chapter 11 has stronger 
rule of law versions that libertarians should cherish.154 
The other main element of the New Deal banking legislation was 
prudential banking regulation and supervision. This responds to two 
needs. First, as we have just seen, the possibility of bailouts creates mor-
al hazard, encouraging banks to take on too much risk. Prudential regula-
tion attempts to limit the risk banks take on. Second, we have focused 
much attention on market failures in the boom phase of the credit cycle. 
Even without bailouts, we have seen that banks and others are likely to 
take on too much debt to make too many risky capital investments during 
the boom phase. Prudential regulation provides a direct way to reduce 
such leverage and risky investment. As we have seen, the better we ex-
pect prudential regulation to succeed in this task, the less we need to use 
monetary policy to deflate asset bubbles. 
The New Deal prudential regulation contributed to decades without 
a serious financial crisis. But eventually the model became increasingly 
creaky, as deregulation and financial innovation led to the growth of sha-
dow banking with a growing number of financial products, institutions, 
and markets not covered under the banking rules. An important need is to 
extend at least basic limits on capital and leverage to institutions in the 
shadow banking world. Does Dodd-Frank do that effectively? That is a 
crucial open question, but the early evidence is not encouraging.155 The 
Act does extend prudential regulation to systemically important institu-
tions.156 But that again (like the new resolution authority) seems to focus 
only on too-big-to-fail companies. It does not account for the fact that 
markets of individually modest but collectively important companies 
behaving in similar ways may pose the same kind of threat to stability. 
Perhaps the Act can be creatively interpreted to extend further down into 
the shadow banking world than its text seems to contemplate, but that 
does not currently appear likely.157 
These are the main general tasks and current open questions for fi-
nancial regulation. But the recent crisis revealed a variety of more specif-
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ic problems, such as opaque derivative markets, morally hazardous secu-
ritization business models, and problematic credit rating agency treat-
ments of mortgage-backed securities. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to 
deal with the major problems revealed. I believe it does so quite plausi-
bly, although one can certainly argue that it goes either too far or not far 
enough.158 Beyond this, as financial institutions and markets rapidly 
evolve, new potential problems will arise, which are hard to anticipate 
now. Financial regulators need to constantly question their current regu-
latory scheme, asking if new rules are needed for new problems or old 
rules have become obsolete. I have argued elsewhere that the Dodd-
Frank Act builds in mechanisms for asking such questions in a large va-
riety of ways.159 
The area of financial regulation remains very much in flux as the 
new Act requires hundreds of new regulations for its implementation. 
These new regulations and the way in which they are enforced will cru-
cially affect the success or failure of the Act. Even this brief overview 
has suggested many points where persons broadly united within a co-
wardly interventionist approach may well disagree over important ele-
ments of the new rules. Still, at a high level of abstraction, the Dodd-
Frank Act seems to be trying to do what a cowardly intervenor thinks 
financial regulation should try to do. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In terms of the two characteristics used to categorize approaches to 
governmental interventions in finance, the Austrian and Keynesian theo-
ries share common ground in their emphasis on ignorance rather than 
greed as the core reason to distrust an institution. This focus on uncer-
tainty in finance helps lead to economic models of business cycles that 
resemble each other in important ways. It also tends to lead to greater 
humility in analysis and policymaking, a welcome feature as we confront 
the complexities of modern finance and economies. The two theories 
differ in what institution they most distrust, with the Austrians most dis-
trusting government while the Keynesians are most distrusting of finan-
cial markets. This leads to wildly differing policy prescriptions in mone-
tary policy, fiscal policy, and financial regulation when one looks at the 
core early writings in the two camps. 
But we have seen that as the theories developed and were exposed 
to the exigencies of history, some of the differences have narrowed 
among some adherents. Each side has been exposed to the reasons for 
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distrust of the institution that it prefers (markets for the Austrians, gov-
ernment for the Keynesians), and each has been hard-pressed to offer 
good arguments in defense of its preferred institution. 
The result among the most pragmatic, moderate adherents of each 
approach is great distrust of both financial markets and government. Fi-
nancial markets on their own are deeply unstable, building up large debts 
during speculative booms that turn into stomach-turning busts. But poli-
ticians and bureaucrats cannot easily be trusted to either dampen the 
booms or ease the busts, both because appropriate policy is extremely 
hard to judge and because political pressures often work against the best 
policies. 
I have proposed an approach called cowardly interventions as a 
middle ground that recognizes these reasons for distrust of both govern-
ment and markets. One should use modest, historically tested interven-
tions in monetary policy, fiscal policy, and financial regulation to try to 
prevent booms from going too far and to ease the hurt from busts when 
they occur, while structuring those interventions in ways that do not in-
terfere too far with markets and try to mitigate the unintended conse-
quences that do result. I have laid out in broad outlines what the results 
look like for each of the three policy areas. 
Viewed from this lens, the responses to the great financial crisis of 
2007 actually do not look too bad, although policy leading up to the cri-
sis looks much worse. As to before 2007: Overly low interest rates in the 
years before the crisis probably helped fuel the housing and securitiza-
tion boom. Fiscal policy was rather responsible during the 1990s, actual-
ly achieving a surplus, but after that tax cuts, Medicare drug benefits, and 
two wars without corresponding spending cuts helped increase the na-
tional debt, leaving the federal government more vulnerable when the 
crisis created a much larger deficit. Financial deregulation led to a loose-
ly regulated shadow banking system and irresponsible levels of debt. All 
of these mistakes illustrate how hard it is for the government to follow 
liberal interventionist prescriptions properly during prosperous times. 
Once the crisis hit, the governmental response was much better 
from a cowardly interventionist perspective, though still far from perfect 
(but then, us cowardly interventionists know not to expect anything re-
sembling perfection). The Federal Reserve proved quite creative in de-
vising aggressive ways to loosen monetary policy when conventional 
policies were too weak. Rescues of failing financial institutions helped 
ward off a Second Great Depression, although often they did not do 
enough to punish those who got the institutions in trouble, thereby wor-
sening moral hazard problems for the future. Automatic stabilizers 
worked as they were supposed to, and Congress and the President sup-
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plemented them with a discretionary stimulus that was probably not large 
enough but still pretty good-sized and structured fairly reasonably, 
though too much took the form of tax cuts for my own druthers.160 The 
Dodd-Frank Act looks like a mostly reasonable attempt to reregulate the 
financial industry, although it probably does not do enough to regulate 
the world of shadow banking. 
Of course, we do not know yet if we are really beyond the most re-
cent crisis. Plenty of paths to a renewed plunge still present themselves. 
Even if we have moved beyond this crisis, we have no idea how well the 
new rules will do in delaying and dampening the next crisis. Even once 
the next crisis has come and gone, economists and historians will un-
doubtedly still debate the effects of the actions taken over the past few 
years. That is another consequence of our widespread ignorance: not on-
ly do we have severe trouble predicting the future, we cannot even clear-
ly and definitively interpret the past. And yet, we (both policymakers and 
scholars) must persevere in both tasks. 
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